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An Overview of Minnesota's Role in the

Federal Nuclear Waste Disposal Process
GREGG lARSON

Gregg Larson is the director of the Minnesota High -Level Radioactive Waste Program.

Introduction
Ever since the dawn of the nuclear age, we have been
assured that there was a solution to the problem of nuclear
waste. In the case of high-level radioactive wastes, however,
which are generated as byproducts of the defense nuclear
weapons program and the commercial generation of electricity, resolution of the problem has been continually postponed. There was disagreement in the scientific community
over the disposal method, dissension in the nuclear industry
among those who viewed the reactor spent fuel as a resource
versus those who viewed it as a waste, and disarray in the
federal government where po litics, in ept management, and
neglect played havoc with waste management programs. In
the words of one former Atomic Energy Commission official ,
"It was not glamorous; there were no careers; it was messy;
nobody got brownie points for caring about nuclear waste. "
In the late '70s, pressure began to mount for a coordinated,
national effort to contend with growing inventories of defense
and commercial wastes. Reprocessing of spent fuel was not
economically feasible, the wastes were an obstacle to nuclear
industry expansion, storage pools at reactor sites were filling,
leaks had occurred at defense installations, and the public
sensitivity was aroused by a growing anti-nuclear movement
and reactor safety problems.
Finally, in the last hours of the 1982 lame duck session,
Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Four aspects of
the Act are especially noteworthy: first, it ended the debate
over method by mandating deep geologic disposal; second, it
established schedules for the siting of two repositories ; third,
it assigned the federal government and the Department of
Energy (DOE) with responsibility for disposal; and fourth , it
recognized that states and Indian tribes had to be involved.

Storage vs. Disposal
It is important to understand the distinction between storage and disposal, because the words are frequently interchanged. A repository is not for temporary storage. Very
simply, disposal , like a diamond, is forever. In this case,
disposal is synonymous with permanent and irretrievable.
After a short operating period of about 50 years, a repositmy
will be forever sealed. It will not be possible to directly
monitor the wastes, remedy problems, or remove the wastes if
something unanticipated occurs during the 10,000 year isolation period. (lf you have a difficult time visualizing 10,000
years into the future , think ofthe past. Going back 10,000 years
takes us to the time of the early cave paintings in Europe and
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to man's first attempts at agriculture.)
Because work was already underway at some potential
disposal locations in the West prior to passage of the Act, those
sites were grandfathered into the first repository program
which is now focusing on basalt formations at Hanford,
Washington, volcanic tuff at the Nevada Test Site, and bedded
salts in the Texas Panhandle. The second repository program,
which is eight years behind the first , includes Minnesota and
other eastern states that have deposits of oystalline rock. In
January of this year, DOE se lected 12 sites in seven states for
further study for a second repository. Three of the 12 are in
Minnesota, as well as five other back-up sites.
In recent months it has become more apparent to us that
there is no need for a secondary repositmy within the time
frame of current planning efforts. Back in 1980, when Congress began to consider legislation, DOE estimated that
167,000 metric tons would need to be disposed of by the year
2020. By 1985, that figure had dropped to 106,000 metric tons.
If one assumes no new reactor orders, which has been the
case for the last seven years, that figure drops to 75,000 tons.
Last week the Governor of Minnesota testified before a U.S.
Ho use Subcommittee at an oversight hearing on th e second
repository program. He noted that nearly 15,000 Minnesotans
voiced their alarm and opposition to this unnecessa1y siting
program at DOE briefings and hearings. He also observed that
scientists should be concerned because thi s program lacks the
technical credibility and commitment to excellence that
should be its hallmark.

Why Scientists Should Be Concerned
I would now like to consider why scientists should be
concerned about this program.
First, the schedule drives the federal nuclear waste pro
gram. Nobody had a Clystal ball back in 1982 when Congress
wrote milestone dates into the Act, although clairvoyants are
going to be necessary to ensure 10,000 years of isolation of
wastes in the repository. The complexity of the task was never
anticipated. We had a similar situation in 1985 in Minnesota
when the legislature required that a herd of wild elk be
relocated by September 1. Despite good intentions and
advance planning, the legislature did not have the cooperation of the elk, and most of the herd is still defiantly roaming
northwestern Minnesota.
In the case of the nuclear waste program, DOE is willing to
compromise technical quality in an effort to meet the Act's
unrealistic deadlines. Few observers believe that the goal of a
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first repository operation date of 1998 is attainable in a program that is already nearly a year and a half behind schedule,
yet DOE still clings to an overly optimistic schedule at the
expense of program credibility and the time needed for scientific investigation.
Second, in the rush to conform to deadlines, and in the light
of political expediency and preconceived notions of how the
job should be done, a commitment to technical excellence is
missing. Last week, the State of Minnesota released a report
that was highly critical of the conduct of the national survey of
oystalline rock that was used to justify selection of the 17
second repository states, all in the eastern half of the country.
This survey is the very foundation of the second repository
siting process. Yet a review of materials obtained following a
Freedom-of- Information-Act request revealed that, in the
words of the contractors, the survey was prepared "almost as a
formality .. .it has never been the intent for this to be a really
thorough study... something less than 1.0 man-year was
expended on this task" These observations were borne out by
the harsh criticism directed at the survey by the scientific
community when it was released in draft form in 1979. In fact,
a final survey was never issued. Yet DOE directed that work
begin in the areas identifled in that flawed draft.
Three years later, after the Act was passed, DOE spent less
than four months resuscitating the same survey. It was
released again, without public review, to confer legitimacy on
the 1983 selection of 17 crystalline states. Not only was the
effort less than adequate , but the survey was technically
flawed and illogically executed, creating a bias that resulted in
picking crystalline rock bodies only in the East.
Last year, the states had to go to court to win the right to
funding for their own technical confirmation studies after
DOE denied the State of Nevada money for drilling studies.
DOE was willing to allow review of its data, but no collection
of independent data.
Third, even though the jury is still out on the suitability of
crvstalline rock for waste isolation, as well as on a number of
g~ophysical, geochemical, and hydrologic questions, the federal government is still proceeding with site selection. Canada
is far ahead of the U.S. in crystalline rock research. However,
the Canadians have stated that they won't be ready to make a
decision on the suitability of crystalline rock until after the
turn of the century, and only then will they begin to consider
sites. Here in the U.S., we've bought into that very same
research (the U.S. recently agreed to spend about 17 million
dollars on cooperative research in Canada) yet we've already
made the decision to pursue disposal in crystalline rock and
are in the process of selecting sites. We've put the cart before
the horse.
Fourth, the siting program i:; tarnished with conflicts-ofinterest. DOE relies heavily on contractors. In some instances,
the prime contractors charged with oversight and quality assurance responsibility are also conducting the actual work In
others, the experts that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1 :\RC) hopes to use for its independent licensing review are
th e same experts that DOE is dependent on for siting work
\ Ioney talks, and in the DOE siting program, it's yelling at
experts who also are being sought by the NRC and the states.
The difficulty in finding untainted experts has led the NRC to
pro pose a stable of "kept" reviewers that could be separated
trom DOE activities until licensing begins in the mid-90's.
Al so, in the second repository program, contractor responsibil ity has been assigned by geographic region. This affects
obj ectivity because it is in the contractor's economic selflnterest to ensure that sites in their region remain under
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consideration. We 're all too familiar with inadvisable projects
that develop a momentum of their own when money, jobs,
and reputations are at stake.
Fifth, research money for waste reduction and other waste
management alternatives is being eliminated. In addition,
DOE wants to drop demonstration programs for extended
fuel burn-up, a technique that would substantially reduce the
amount of waste by burning reactor fuel more efficiently.
Penny-wise and pound foolish, DOE would cut a few million
dollars that would promote a very promising technology that
could save billions by further diminishing the need for a
second repository.
Sixth, the federal government does not, and I repeat, does
not , have as its goal selection of the safest possible sites. DOE
readily admits that all they're looking for are sites that meet the
minimum licensing criteria. How is DOE ever going to be able
to convince a prospective host state to shoulder this national
burden if they're unable to argue that it was chosen because it
was the safest possible?
Given all the disposal uncertainties and the 10,000 year
length of the isolation period, we should expect nothing less
of DOE than a commitment to find the sites with the greatest
margin of safety. DOE likes to respond to this criticism by
arguing that there will never be full agreement on where the
safest possible sites are. They are probably right, but we are
still certain that the program would greatly benefit from this
objective. At a recent hearing before a very unreceptive Senate
Subcommittee, Minnesota argued for just such an approach.
In a follow-up written interrogatory, the Chairman of the
Subcommittee asked whether a search for the safest possible
site wasn't analogous to setting out across the country looking
for the best restaurant - how would you ever know or agree
that you had found it? We didn't think the analogy was very
appropriate, but we carried it a step further by responding that,
even if the outcome were uncertain, the endeavor would still
be worthwhile if you knew that you had to eat three meals a
clay at the chosen restaurant for the next 10,000 years.
Finally, permanent disposal may not be the best solution.
Ever since the Atomic Energy Commission first looked at the
nuclear waste problem in 1955, the mindset has been disposal. The National Academy of Sciences Committee that was
created that year issued their first report recommending geological disposal in 1957. This solution shouldn't have come as
a surprise because it was a product of the "Committee on
Geological Aspects of Waste Disposal.''
There was a short flirtation with storage in later years, but it
was abandoned because the federal government and nuclear
power proponents were vulnerable to the charge that there
was no "final " solution. In the 1980 Environmental Impact
Statement on nuclear waste management, storage was labeled
the no-action alternative and dismissed in one paragraph.
That's about the same amount of space that the National
Lampoon iVlagazine gave to their proposal for waste disposal
in tupperware containers because "they close up tight and
keep something just about forever." When the Act was finally
passed in 1982, Congress chose deep geological disposal. The
Wall Streetjournalcallecl it the "Geologist's Full Employment
Act" and noted that, "it was the largest public works program
ever foisted onto the American public by Congress."
Why the obsession with burial? The two reasons most often
given are first, it reduces the likelihood of reprocessing and
possible proliferation of weapons-grade plutonium and,
second, it eliminates the need for institutions that must have
the longevity to guarantee a secure and safe storage site. But
disposal provides no assurance that reprocessing or prolifera-
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tion won't occur anyway, and it's difficult to understand the
concern over institutional control when a similar concern
exists for nuclear weapons and toxic chemicals.
I think there also are less visible agendas. Some in industty
feel that an "out of sight, out of mind" waste policy is the only
way to revive nuclear power. Some opponents of nuclear
power view disposal as a costly, slow process that could
further delay that revival.

Advantages of Long-Term Storage
But long-term storage warrants another look because it has
some very distinct advantages. Geology is less important, so
there are fewer siting constraints. Direct monitoring of the
waste would be possible, and any unforeseen problems could
be remedied. Future technological development could result
in safer disposal or a new use for the waste. Even if there were
no such technological developments, the fuel would have
cooled in the interim, both thermally and radioactively. Last,
but certainly not least, long-term storage would be less costly
than disposal, and it might even be politically easier to site. I
can't help but believe that future generations would prefer to
have passed on to them the options associated with responsi·
ble storage, rather than the uncertainties associated with permanent and irretrievable disposal. In fact, the only thing certain about deep geologic disposal is that the people making
the decisions won 't be around to answer for them.

Conclusion
In conclusion, I want to note that this is a political, as well as
technical process. Anyone who tells you otherwise is either
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incredibly naive or a liar. Concentration on politics alone,
however, is inadvisable. When told the results of an over·
whelmingly negative Wisconsin referendum in 1984, in which
89 percent of the voters opposed a repositoty, DOE
responded that it was very encouraged by the 11 percent that
favored a site.
While you're all probably aware of the position the Governo r, the Legislature, and our Congressional delegation have
taken in opposing a disposal site in Minnesota, you're probably less aware of the technical side to our effort, which is just as
important. Since 1983, the State has actively monitored the
federal program. We have retained outside technical and state
agency contractors, we testifY before the NRC, we review all
documents released by the DOE and other federal agencies
working on this program, and we have submitted hundreds of
pages of analysis and comments.
We aren 't dissuaded by the "not in my backyard" label it's currently a very trendy way to dismiss public concern and
legitimate questions. Our philosophy has been to take as
critical an approach as possible, maintaining that the burden
of proof rests with the federal government. We intend that the
burden be a heavy one, and we will ask every question and
explore every avenue along the way.

Author's note: On May 28, 1986, the U.S Department of
l:.'nergy ·postponed indefinitely" the second repository program. The DOE cites some of the same arguments raised in this
article with respect to declining waste generation projections
to justify postponement. Nonetheless, most of the criticalp oints
raised here still apply to the DOE nuclear waste program.
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